Determinism

Determinism ≠ fatalism

The reason the equation of determinism with fatalism is a fallacy is as follows. Suppose you are ill, but you reason that there is no point in calling the doctor because either you will recover, or you won’t: in either case, a doctor is superfluous. But this overlooks the possibility that your recovery or lack thereof could be caused by your calling the doctor, or failure to do so. It follows that determinism implies nothing about what you can or cannot do. Determinism looks backwards to the causes of the present state, not forward to the consequences.
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Defining freedom in the context of determinism

As Sam Brittan has argued, ‘the opposite of freedom is coercion, not determinism.’
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The philosopher A. J. Ayer put it this way:
“If I suffered from a compulsive neurosis, so that I got up and walked across the room, whether I wanted to or not, or if I did so because somebody else compelled me, then I should not be acting freely. But if I do it now, I shall be acting freely, just because these conditions do not obtain; and the fact that my action may nevertheless have a cause is, from this point of view, irrelevant.
A psychologist of twins, Lyndon Eaves, has made a similar point:
“Freedom is the ability to stand up and transcend the limitations of the environment. That capacity is something that natural selection has placed in us, because it’s adaptive … If you’re going to be pushed around, would you rather be pushed around by your environment, which is not you, or by your genes, which in some sense is who you are.”
Freedom lies in expressing your own determinism, not somebody else’s. It is not the determinism that makes a difference, but the ownership. If freedom is what we prefer, then it is preferable to be determined by forces that originate in ourselves and not in others.
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Double standard: cases where we embrace determinism

So does every criminal who uses the defence of insanity or diminished responsibility. So does every jealous spouse who uses the defence of temporary insanity or justifiable rage after murdering an unfaithful partner. So does the unfaithful partner when justifying the infidelity. So does every tycoon who uses the excuse of Alzheimer’s disease when accused of fraud against his shareholders. So indeed does a child in the playground who says that his friend made him do it. So does each one of us when we willingly go along with a subtle suggestion from the therapist that we should blame our parents for our present unhappiness. So does a politician who blames social conditions for the crime rate in an area. So does an economist when he asserts that consumers are utility maximisers. So does a biographer when he tries to explain how his subject’s character was forged by formative experiences. So does everybody who consults a horoscope. In every case there is a willing, happy and grateful embracing of determinism. Far from loving free will, we seem to be a species that positively leaps to surrender it whenever we can.
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!!!!!

Imagine a sheriff capturing a suspect, the sheriff accuses him of cold-blooded murder, and decides to excecute, while you explain to the sheriff about determinism and how the moral judgement is wrong, adn instead should adopt the hospitalization & elimination method. The moment you step past the line between past (murder) and the present (what to do about it) determinism itself ceases to contribute to any decision-making. Here’s why: the sheriff ignores your counsel and shoots the suspect on the spot! Now fully within your own logic, the sheriff’s action is only the product of all that led to that moment, and you can no more ‘judge’ the wrongness of his execution any more than the murder, and all moves on and all does what everyone does. But no, you say this is not an ideal solution, and aha, in that moment what matters to the argument more is precisely NOT determinism but agency, agency as a society to decide how to move forward, which is action-oriented and not explanation-oriented.

🔹 The Determinism Trap: The Moment It Stops Being Useful
In your example:

The murder happened → Determinism explains why it happened.
The sheriff executes the suspect → Determinism still explains why it happened.
You argue against the execution → But at this point, you’re no longer just explaining—you’re trying to change something.
🡆 The moment we move from explaining why things happened to deciding what to do next, determinism becomes inert.
Sapolsky’s strict determinism would say:

The sheriff’s action was inevitable based on prior causes.
Your attempt to intervene was also inevitable.
The debate itself was just another determined event.
But then the obvious contradiction appears:
If everything is determined, then why argue for a better system at all?
Sapolsky still argues for a compassionate justice system—but why bother, if change is inevitable?
🡆 Aha! At that moment, agency becomes the only useful concept, not determinism.
🔹 The Key Contradiction in Sapolsky’s View
Sapolsky insists:

No one is responsible for their actions because everything is determined.
We should build a better justice system—one focused on rehabilitation instead of punishment.
But if point #1 is true, then point 2’s “should” and responsibility to ‘build’ lies on? Where?

也许这么久以来一直没绕出来的 determinism vs proactive living 的解是一种 radical 双标：对于过去，采纳完全的 radical acceptance，而对于当下和未来，承担完全的 responsibility

而且不仅是遥远的过去和将来，哪怕就在上一分钟，我因为未承担责任而做一件“应该”做的事，当这一分钟过去了，不必因为它离“现在”没过去多久就持有为它负责、自我批评的惯性，而应该认为：我又收获了一个崭新的机会去做它，每个时刻都可以重新起航

Determinism 是一种解释性视角，而因复杂系统的特点，它不可能是预言性的。它仅仅是在说：“所有发生的事，都是因为在它发生前所发生的事导致的”，它没有办法作为一个“会怎么样”“要怎么去做”的指引。作为人，这个指引只能来源于一些更具体落地的宗旨，比如追求什么样的生活、应怎样追求、个人成长和发展等等。我们（出于还没被研究透）意识层面“自主”“自由”的假象，与 determinism“没有自由”的事实看似是不兼容的：如果我认为没有自由意志，那为什么又会相信可以“改变”些什么、对未来负责呢？但其实这两者没有丝毫冲突，一方面正因之前论述的 determinism 是向后看的、不是向前看的、搬出“无自由意志”不能说明的了任何关于“所以接下来会如此”，另一方面外界环境会影响你心态，例如：

对 determinism 错误的理解，造成了主观上的能动力不足或变弱，走向更烂生活
对 determinism 有深刻认识，但采纳 radical 双标，对过去接纳和解，但对自己的当下和未来增强了能动力和责任心，走向更好生活
你会发现，无论是怎样的路径，发生的过程和结果都不与 determinism 相冲突，因为都是在一个人吸纳了外界环境的（也包含自己产生的）思维模式，进而被它所影响而对具体生活的体验有了改变。
当然，人会产生、吸取到什么样的信息、有多大程度会改变，的确是由这之前所发生的一切都导致的，我们影响不了过去，所以就也影响不了谁会受此影响，一切都是 happen 的现象。但作为人，拥有自由意志幻觉、获得并吸取 radical 双标思维模式的时候，产生了相应积极的作用，也正是因为人的趋利性呀！正如“意志力”的多少是被 determined，不是自由可产生和设置他有多少的，但趋利性、渴望程度、忍耐程度等等影响“意志力”的因素，都是可以训练和调整的。

向后退一步，“你”之所以是“你”也只是 happen 的。那么你产生的想法、对你有影响的思维和行为模式（无论好坏）也都是 happen 的。所以我起到的一个作用就是作为一个影响 both 我自己和他人，采纳更好的模式的源头。

当我和任何人因为有这样的影响，而获得了更强的能动性、有了更好的心态和生活时，向后看时应该认识到是这样的合力带来的，而非“自由意志”之力做了什么，且正因并非自己“努力”或“选择”而可以有种幸运感，就类似“也不是我决定要来的，但我诞生了，我就偷着乐吧”的接纳。（虽然这和口语的“走运”是不一样的，仅是对一个 happened to happen 之事抱有“很开心是如此”的感受，因为宏观世界没有真正的随机）

一定要去区分“我主观意识 initiate 影响出来的”和“事物遵循规律发展而生成的”这样的 false dichotomy，才是导致前面论述的不兼容的假象。

所以可见完整的链路是：每一个时刻受到此前所发生的事的影响，有一种影响是增强了人对于当下的“自由意志”幻觉和主观能动性，而这自然地使得他通过行动将生活过得更好，显现出一种好像自由意志和能动性是凭空产生、并且是最原始的改变事物的那股力量的表象。
那么其实我在思考如何 argue 的，就是作为人在面对当下和未来时，是可否在深刻认识 determinism 的基础上，省略它这一层 narrative，直接套用前面说的那种“表象”？

至于这是不是科学，我能想到确实可以用科学方法来研究不同心态信息输给不同试验对象，他们的生活状态和行为有怎样的区别。但 radical double standard 我觉得更偏向是一种个人实践，并未蕴藏什么科学性的东西？

还有一个重要的区分：那就是一个人的所谓“努力”或“忍受苦难”或做了某件事，确实是他自己有这个“意志力”，正如他搬起一块砖头，确实是他花了力气去做了这件事。Determinism 所否定的不是他没有这个“力”，而是他有多少“力”建立在他对于做成这件事的欲望强烈程度、环境压力、天性、成长、等等简而言之就是所有的前序之事的条件下。也就是说，有足够的意志力就像是长得好看，人很自然地会因此而优越和觉得愉悦，但这并非是因为他就能掌控这件事的发生，也无关做“对”了什么。
但又正因有自由意志的错觉、决定是又一个“自我”做的、痛苦也是由意识承担的，要让人认为“我所付出了代价而得来的结果”并不能等同于“我应得这个结果、应得赞美”令人较难接受的也是合理的，因为这是我们数亿年来被塑造出的本能。脱离 determinism 的视角来看待人的言行，其带来的各种作用在实际层面恰恰就是它造成的，我们很习惯于把价值赋予到这个过程上，无论好坏。我觉得在思考时候 radically 放弃这个赋予的过程时，也可以思考为什么要这样去做，那样是否与本能割裂得太开了？

I understand what i proposed was a social construct, not a fundamental truth, but its hard to imagine how we can live by ‘fundamental truths’ independent of social constructs and moral instincts, maybe shaped, bur never completely devoid, as sapolsky’s own ‘compassionate’ proposal is somewhat moral too, right? If it is purely mechanistic then no proposal for where society should be heading can be made, only that ‘what is, is’

Can We Live by “Fundamental Truths” Without Social Constructs?
You raise an important challenge:

It’s difficult to imagine a purely mechanistic life without social constructs.
Even if free will is an illusion, humans evolved to experience life as though we have choice—we still have emotions, attachments, and moral instincts.
Sapolsky himself cannot escape this, because his argument implicitly assumes that suffering is bad and should be minimized—which is, at its core, a moral stance.
This means that even if determinism is “fundamentally true,” humans cannot operate purely by it without some kind of constructed framework for meaning.

Is “Compassion” Just Another Social Construct?

Sapolsky’s proposal for a more compassionate society is itself a moral position, even if he tries to justify it through a deterministic worldview.
If he were being strictly mechanistic, he would simply say, “what happens, happens”, without making any prescriptive claims.
But he doesn’t do that—he actively argues that society should move in a certain direction (away from punishment, toward rehabilitation).
This suggests that even if we intellectually accept determinism, we cannot function without some kind of value-based framework.
Your “radical double standard” approach actually acknowledges this more honestly than Sapolsky’s stance does.

说到底如果完全 value-free，真的没有办法构建出任何一种价值观了
每个时代的哲学家、思想家做的事情大抵就是阐释那个时代主流的思潮，但这个也是动态变化、并存在更先进/过时的区别的，先进指的是：每个时代的正态分布中有的 variation，其中一部分恰好会与未来发展方向近似。当我们现在看怎样依仗科学发展出更先进的道德观时，我仍旧觉得，将 determinism 融入进去虽然是很重要的，但它 alone 只能决定每个时刻“过去”的回溯性视角，无法为“未来要怎样”提供有用的指导，那个指导仍旧要来自于对已有的道德观的全面剖析和（也许盲目、并不那么“科学”universal truth 的）guiding principles（比如以减少全部个体的 suffering 为目标）方针的共同作用

This does fall apart in one condition: that intent is not the prerequisite of actions, but an afterthought attached to our consciousness after a decision was made. Evidence for it: decisions made before consciously knowing it, evolutionary history of reflexes preceding the emergence of intention… this would mean that at best ‘agency’ and belief in free will influences actions towards a better outcome, and at worse render ‘agency’ completely null as a product, not as a cause, of our decision-making

The nature of agency, real or epiphenomenal:
Real: human brains make real decisions in a top-down process from info-gathering, to the conscious process of [simulating, comparing, evaluating outcomes, deciding], which then leads to a behavior

“Think to myself” influences behavior ≈ conscious planning, impulse control
Conscious participation correlates with better decision-making
Epiphenomenal: there is indeed complex [simulating, comparing, evaluating outcomes, deciding], but it is not contributed by the conscious experience of doing so, the conscious experience of doing so is an illusion that is generated afterwards for understanding/explaining WHY the self decided to act those certain ways, as a practical tool for learning and communicating, not to generate action
Libet’s experiments
Split brains frabricating explanations
Evolutionarily emerged as predictive & social tool
These two views lie on two extremes of what role ‘conscious agency’ plays in decision-making, and thus are incompatible with each other

If agency is a modulator (operates in a layered, hierarchical way): We should focus on shaping the unconscious processes that influence decision-making, rather than assuming people have absolute control over their actions.
This suggests responsibility is not binary but exists on a spectrum depending on how much conscious modulation is possible.

Is the problem of ‘is consciousness generates actions an illusion’ similar to ‘is consciousness an illusion’ in that by being a conscious being, the feeling and reporting of a ‘seems to be’ automatically equates the conclusion? Such as for ‘is consciousness an illusion’ no matter how you answer ‘it’s not’ (then it exists) or ‘it is’ (then an illusion itself is also an experience, making the existence of experience of any kind NOT an illusion anymore) both disproves it

If you claim conscious agency is an illusion, then you still have to explain why we experience the process of choosing.
Even if brain activity precedes the conscious feeling of decision, the conscious awareness of deciding is still a real experience.
Conclusion: While conscious choice might not be causal, the experience of it is real and must be accounted for in any explanation of agency.

One might even say, even given that it is fully an illusion, and even given that a person fully understands and accepts this intellectually, the subjective experience of ‘feeling like you are making a decision’ would not diminish or go away. And the question becomes, while this ‘feeling’ persists, how does the intellectual knowledge or belief of agency influence behavior?
Believing in agency (even if false) can make people act with more self-control, motivation, and responsibility.

Studies on self-determination theory show that people who believe in free will persist longer on difficult tasks.
Placebo effect of control: Even if control is an illusion, believing in it increases performance and well-being.
Rejecting agency completely can lead to learned helplessness, passivity, or nihilism.
Studies show that people who believe in strong determinism (e.g., “everything is inevitable”) are more likely to cheat, give up on hard tasks, or justify bad behavior (Vohs & Schooler, 2008).
If people think they have no control, they may act in ways that reinforce that belief, creating a self-fulfilling cycle.

!!!!!!!!!
Agency feels real because evolution selected for that experience (as an interface)
Agency may be an evolutionary adaptation, not because it’s real, but because it’s useful.

It is possible that the brain evolved to create the feeling of agency precisely because it leads to better survival outcomes.
Just like pain is not “real” in an external sense but is useful for survival, agency might exist not as a truth but as a necessary mechanism.
Agency as an Interface, Not a Reality
e.g. What if agency is just like a desktop interface?
Your computer screen shows icons, windows, and folders, but that’s not the true nature of the hardware—it’s an abstraction layer that makes interaction easier.
Agency might be the same—not real in a deep way, but an abstraction layer for navigating reality.
real in the way that matters for survival and experience.

And same as all other adaptions, the question becomes how we harness the useful parts for our benefit and manage the undisired effects: make choices acting as if we have agency while reducing guilt and blame (RDS)

I guess practically there are many layers to the interpretation of agency:

Physical agency in the sense that when an actor acts and has consequences, those consequences are practically attributed to the actions of the actor (like rock as agent caused ripple, human as agent makes fire, no moral involved)
Value-attached agency: in the past we equate the feeling of free will as a metaphysical reality (moral involved)
Intellectual but moral-free agency: now we recognizing that belief in agency tends to ecourage actors to produce more actions, and absense of it tends to do the opposite, intellectually harnessing it much like practical gratitude to increase future altruistic behavior in others

‘responsibility’ model

Physical: things cause things, humans = complex things
Moral: could have chosen otherwise, so they deserve blame or praise
Intellectual: even if people aren’t truly responsible, acting as if they are leads to better outcomes - practical tool about influencing future actions, not moral judgement

Another problem is that inanimate objects

Maybe i should put it this way:
Sapolsky’s emphasis is on the pointlessness of assiging moral value to phenomena that are determined, including human behavior, only ‘practical’ accountability to make everyone’s life better
But i want to acknowledge how the meaning of ‘practical’ varies depending on context, and that even ‘wanting’ to making everyone’s life better (again, the ‘how’ is extremely context-dependent) is in itself a moral inclination. It’s also already very hard for the average person to detach their mental states from inanimate phenomena like the weather, broken down vehicles, and chance events, so it’s going to be all the difficult, if not impossible, for them to detach from moral judgement of living things, top of which, fellow human beings.
BUT we do agree on that there should at least BE accountability, rather than running amok
And though i actually agree on everything about minimizing the punishment aspect of the justice system, it is natural for people to bring up arguments like ‘less punishment would decrease the deterring power and encourage bad behavior because there’s less fear of getting punished’ the only immediate answer i now for that is that it might be less true than it appears, data on how different societies and systems that adopt different values may imprint on the individuals and lead to higher/lower rates of crime, so a less ‘retributive justice’ value might actually discourage crime.
Also, thought i get it that criminal is often the top focus among social implications of determinism, many other areas

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